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Abstract
Individual sales prices and local vacancy rates in the housing market pose
a natural analogy to the wage curve, a popular concept in labor economics
that describes how individual wages decrease with higher local unemploy-
ment. While housing search and matching models and housing externalities
strongly suggest a stable inverse relationship, there is still a lack of con-
vincing empirical research on the sensitivity of house sales to local vacancy
variation. Based on more than 10,000 single-family home transactions from
the German market, this paper confirms a robust house price-vacancy curve
among individual home prices and adjacent residential vacancies. The eco-
nomic size of the relationship is highly comparable across all four analyzed
states: a doubling of the vacancy rate at the municipality level is associated
with a 5-8% discount in quality-controlled selling prices. Despite negative
price signals, local vacancy distributions tend to persist over long time hori-
zons, leaving room for policy intervention.
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1 Introduction
Elevated vacancy rates in local housing markets pose a fundamental risk to pri-
vate homeowners. Large inventories of vacant dwellings for sale or rent imply an
aﬄuent supply of housing that potential buyers consider as possible substitutes.1
This depresses the bargaining power of sellers and incentivizes them to accept
lower offers more quickly (Hartley, 2014). Vacant homes not in active supply
can depress selling prices of adjacent properties through negative externalities
associated with negligence or vandalism (Rossi-Hansberg et al., 2010). Through
both these channels, elevated vacancies in local housing markets increase indi-
vidual resale risk, the virtually unhedgeable risk of not being able to sell a house
at an adequate price within a sufficiently short marketing time (DiPasquale and
Wheaton, 1996; Krainer, 2001).2 A negative link should consequently emerge
between individual sales prices in an area and the corresponding local rate of
vacancy.
While the theoretical arguments are appealing, it is a challenging task to pin
down the exact relationship among individual house prices and local vacancy lev-
els empirically. The present paper aims at filling this gap. Based on representative
data on more than 10,000 individual single-family home (SFH) transactions from
the German housing market, we provide microeconometric evidence in favor of
a robust house price-vacancy curve that is largely invariant to geography. Based
on exploiting small-scale heterogeneity in residential vacancy rates, we postu-
late that individual property prices and housing vacancies render a close analogy
to the popular labor economics concept of the wage curve, which describes the
negative link between individual workers’ earnings and aggregate unemployment
in the relevant labor market and has been coined by some an empirical law in
economics (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994; Nijkamp and Poot, 2005).3
There is a surprising lack of empirical research aimed at housing vacancies in
general, and in particular at measuring the sensitivity of individual selling prices
to local variation in vacancy. This can hardly be attributed to a lack of the-
ory: some early influential research on housing market search and matching has
strongly suggested a stable inverse relationship (Wheaton, 1990; Forgey et al.,
1996). Piazzesi et al. (2015) recently extend the housing market matching litera-
1Piazzesi et al. (2015) document that housing search occurs predominantly among three
dimensions: geography, price and, to a lesser extent, home size.
2Not all vacancy is necessarily associated with excess supply or negative externalities: some
housing units are held vacant for seasonal use, while others are vacant only for short time periods
in order to accomodate movers. Only a substantial rate of unintended, long-term vacancy
signals a truly deficient allocation of economic resources. For a recent discussion of U.S. housing
vacancies, see Molloy (2016).
3The wage curve is commonly interpreted as an equilibrium locus that reflects local dif-
ferences in efficiency wages or bargaining power (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994; Card, 1995;
Blanchflower and Oswald, 2005). The empirically most supported relationship is one of constant
elasticity, log(w) = α+ βlog(u) + other variables.
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ture by allowing for multiple market segments and heterogeneous searchers, still
showing that prices and inventory covary negatively within submarkets. A possi-
ble explanation for the lack of comprehensive empirics is the lack of reliable data
on vacancy at appropriately small spatial scales for wider geographical areas (es-
pecially nationwide). Much different from individual unemployment, residential
vacancies are seldomly reported on a systematic basis. Very few data sets allow
linking transaction prices with sufficiently disaggregated information on vacancy
in the relevant housing (sub-)markets.
The present paper contributes to the literature in three main ways. First,
we have access to a nationwide, complete count of non-seasonal, non-recreational
vacant dwellings derived from an inventory of the German housing stock for
the year of 2011. This enables us to investigate the effect of vacancies on nearby
property prices for a much larger geographical area than previous studies. Second,
this is one of the few attempts to investigate the relationship at hand outside of
the U.S. To our knowledge, it is the first one to do so for Germany, the largest
housing market in Europe. From observing very similar coefficients across the
four analyzed German states, we thirdly motivate the novel concept of a house
price-vacancy curve, which we interpret as symmetric case of the well-known wage
curve in local labor markets. Our study provides a starting point for further
research on this new concept.
We estimate that a doubling of the vacancy rate at the level of the local
municipality is associated with an 8-12% decrease of individual single-family home
selling prices. This price discount lies in an economically plausible range and
holds across different states and specifications. The observed vacancy elasticity
of individual home prices is strikingly close to the unemployment elasticity of
individual wages, which is commonly measured at about -0.1 (Nijkamp and Poot,
2005). Among competing explanations for this downward-sloping house price-
vacancy curve, we argue that increased sales time and lower seller reservation
prices arising from increased competition are the most promising ones.
Our analysis carefully takes account of potential coefficient bias related to
omitted variables or reverse causality. It is reasonable to assume that many
factors that influence individual home selling prices are also correlated with the
local rate of vacancy. Ignoring those factors would result in biased estimation
of the true relationship between the vacancy rate and sales prices. We therefore
control for a broad range of property- and neighborhood-level characteristics in
hedonic pricing models. Since homeowners may moreover be prone to leave their
house vacant just when house prices in the neighborhood are low, we employ
instrumental variable regression in order to address this potential issue of reverse
causality.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 serves to moti-
vate the case of a downward-sloping house price-vacancy curve, focusing on two
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major channels: competition and negative externalities. Section 3 presents and
discusses the data set used to identify price-vacancy curves. Section 4 discusses
the hedonic pricing equations, including a discussion of functional form. State-by-
state econometric results are provided in Section 5, including robustness checks
on variable selection and endogeneity. In view of a robust result of negative price
effects arising from higher local vacancies, Section 6 discusses the extent to which
these discounts drive local housing markets back to equilibrium in the long run,
making use of historical data on small-scale vacancy rate distributions. Section
7 concludes and discusses potential limitations and policy implications.
2 Motivating a House Price-Vacancy Curve
2.1 Competition
A first channel through which vacant dwellings are expected to negatively af-
fect nearby house prices is increased competition for buyers. Wheaton (1990)
proposes a stylized search and matching model that rationalizes systematic links
between vacancy, expected sales time and selling prices in the housing market.
The model is inspired by the labor economics workhorse models of Diamond
(1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1990) and treats vacancy and prices
as equilibrium outcomes in an environment of uncertainty and bargaining.4 The
steady-state solution of the model states that the reservation price of optimiz-
ing seller-buyers5—the marginal price at which a randomly arriving offer is to be
accepted—is inversely proportional to expected sales time and the costs of holding
two units at a time. Since a larger inventory of vacant units in the relevant mar-
ket increases expected sales time for each individual seller in the market, higher
vacancies result in lower selling prices in the short- as well as in the long-run.6
A downside feature of the theoretical model by Wheaton (1990) is its predic-
tion of an extreme sensitivity of selling prices with regard to expected marketing
time, which is in turn inversely proportional to vacancy. In the calibration of his
model, a doubling of the vacancy rate induces very strong price declines of as
much as 50 per cent. The reason for this unrealistically large sensitivity is that
buyers in his model are unconstrained: since buyers are also sellers, there is no
market entry or exit, which renders demand highly inelastic with regard to price.
4Williams (1995) generalizes Wheaton’s model to a continuous time setting and shows that
many of the comparative statics from this model are also valid in a dynamic setting.
5Different from labor markets, where personal unemployment spells occur even with voluntary
job changes, mobility in housing markets generally involves spells in which households own or
rent two units. In this case, mobile households become buyers and sellers at the same time.
6Based on the idea of search and matching, it can be argued that there must be an optimal
(or „natural“) rate of vacancy. In analogy to the natural rate of unemployment, Rosen and
Smith (1983) and Gabriel and Nothaft (2001) define it as the rate of vacancy at which housing
prices are (dynamically) stable. No concensus has yet been reached on the level of optimal
vacancy, which is likely to highly depend on market context.
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It is unlikely to observe such large sensitivity of prices with regard to vacancy in
reality for at least two reasons: first, market entries and exits potentially account
for a very substantial part of transactions. In this case, buyers are not necessarily
sellers in the same market, which allows demand to be much more elastic with
respect to price. Second, moving households residing in high-vacancy, „illiquid“
areas might accept a longer sales time and price their house high enough to avoid
nominal losses or to fish for a downpayment on the next house. This behav-
ioral argument was first brought forward by Stein (1995) and has found strong
empirical support by Genesove and Mayer (2001).
Krainer (2001) integrates the loss aversion argument into a matching model
where selling prices, expected sales time and sales volume depend simultaneously
on buyers’ state-varying valuations of housing services. Shocks to the fundamen-
tal value of housing in this model are not solely transmitted through changes in
selling prices: when prices are sticky in that they do not drop too strongly in
weak markets, there also must be a transmission through a change in sales time.
In times of high valuations of housing services, sellers price properties in a way
that ensures swift transactions: they avoid being forced to sell in times of lower
buyer valuations. When buyers’ valuations of housing services are low instead,
sellers accept longer sales times instead of transacting at prices that would ensure
the same amount of liquidity, which results in lower sales volumes and higher in-
ventory. High vacancy rates in „cold“ markets go along with relatively low prices,
and vice versa.
Genesove and Han (2012) empirically test these key predictions of housing
market matching models. While not explicitly focusing on vacancy, they inves-
tigate the effect of demand shocks on average sales time (inversely related to
vacancy) and the number of homes that buyers visit. Based on survey data of
homebuyers conducted by the National Association of Realtors combined with
data on demand shocks at the level of U.S. MSAs, they provide evidence that
with rising demand, time on the market decreases for both buyers and sellers,
but more strongly so for sellers. This result confirms that the probability of a
match increases with demand. The increase in probability drives prices up, while
simultaneously reducing average sales time and housing vacancy.
A recent paper by Piazzesi et al. (2015) advances the theoretical literature on
housing market search, vacancy and prices by studying housing markets with mul-
tiple segments searched by heterogeneous clienteles. Their approach differs from
existing models of housing search in the assumption that searchers are inhomoge-
neous, which implies that a housing market can be partitioned into heteregeneous
submarkets. Their model is able to match the empirical fact that search activity,
turnover and inventory typically covary positively within local housing markets,
but negatively across those units. In particular, individual houses are cheaper in
areas or segments where houses take long times to sell due to many alternatives
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(more inventory), which Piazzesi et al. (2015) call a „liquidity discount“. Liq-
uidity discounts can differ widely across segments, even within the same narrow
geographic area.
2.2 Negative externalities
A second channel through which vacant dwellings are expected to affect nearby
house prices is adverse spillover effects. House values are known to be highly de-
pendent on buyers’ perceived quality of location, which is strongly related to the
physical condition and appearance of neighboring homes. Leaving homes vacant
is a primary example of a „housing externality“ as coined by Rossi-Hansberg
et al. (2010): the social costs associated with vacancy-related negligence or van-
dalism are not incorporated in property owners’ decisions.7 Based on detailed
data on the Neighborhoods-in-Bloom urban revitalization program in Richmond,
Virginia, Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2010) show that demolition, rehabilitation and
reconstruction of vacant homes had strong positive effects on land values in im-
pact areas compared to otherwise comparable control neighborhoods.8 These
externalities tend to be extremely spatially concentrated, declining by half about
every 1000 feet.
As a response to the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, much recent research has
investigated spillover effects from foreclosures on nearby house prices. Exploiting
exogenous variation in U.S. state judicial foreclosure requirements, Mian et al.
(2015) find a large negative impact of foreclosures on nearby house prices and
suggest that through consequent drops in consumption and investment, the spike
in foreclosures was an important factor in the length and depth of the great
recession. Gerardi et al. (2015) and Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2016) also provide
evidence for negative effects of nearby foreclosures on single-family home prices.
Lin et al. (2009) and Campbell et al. (2011) demonstrate that price discounts
strongly increase with closer proximity to foreclosed properties. It is however
important to note that foreclosures do not automatically overlap with vacancies,
and only a limited number of studies disentangles negative spillover effects of
foreclosures from increased competition through more available housing supply.
Anenberg and Kung (2014) and Hartley (2014) attempt to decompose the price
effect of foreclosures into a competition and a disamenity component. They both
find that the spillover component is near zero for most analyzed areas, which
suggests a dominance of the competition channel.
One of the very few papers focusing explicitly on vacant dwellings is Whitaker
and Fitzpatrick (2013). This study links vacancy observations from U.S. Postal
7The strategic situation of individual homeowners in a high-vacany housing (sub-)market
resembles the classic prisoners’ dilemma Nash-equilbrium, in which the socially optimal result
of demolishing excess housing in order to stabilise individual house prices is not achieved.
8Neighborhoods to be revitalized were selected with regard to multiple criteria, including the
stock of vacant houses.
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Service data with property-tax delinquency and housing sales data from Cuya-
hoga County, Ohio, between 2010-2011. Distressed homes, which are defined as
either tax-delinquent, foreclosed, or vacant, all have negative effects on selling
prices of nearby single-family homes. Concerning the separate effect of vacancy,
any additional vacant house within a 500 feet radius reduces selling prices by
about 1% in low-poverty census tracts, whereas no such effect is found in high-
poverty census tracts. Price discounts get larger if vacant homes are also tax-
delinquent, which the authors associate with property neglect. Compared to the
prior findings, the quantitative effect of vacancy is small, which suggests that
jointly estimating the effect of foreclosure, vacancy and tax-delinquency over-
states the separate impact of each.
3 Data
We analyse large cross-sections of individual SFH transactions completed between
January 1 and December 30, 2011 in four different German states. Our sample
covers the states of Brandenburg (BB) and Saxony-Anhalt (SA) as two east-
ern (former German Democratic Republic) states, as well as Lower Saxony (LS)
and Rhineland-Palatinate (RP) as two western states. All transaction data are
obtained from the Superior Committees of Valuation Experts (Obere Gutachter-
ausschüsse in German) of the corresponding states, public agencies that main-
tain registers on the entire universe of property sales in the specific state.9 The
transaction data are detailed and highly representative, which makes our results
applicable to the whole SFH stock: we have access to a 26 percent random sample
of the entire population of SFH transactions in 2011 for Lower Saxony, and the
total population of all transactions for the other three states. In total, our sample
covers 10,689 individual sales, including transacted properties’ characteristics.
We match the individual transaction data to small-scale spatial data on va-
cancies and structural variables capturing cross-sectional differences in socio-
demographic and economic conditions among localities. Matching occurs at the
level of municipalities, which typically range between U.S. Census Block Groups
and Census Tracts in terms of population size.10 We obtain data on vacan-
cies from a complete inventory of the German housing stock compiled within
the 2011 Census, which encompassed a count of non-seasonal, non-recreational
vacant housing units.11 A housing unit is considered vacant if it was neither
9Individual property transaction data in Germany are collected decentrally and still in a
heterogeneous way. So far, all but one German states have established a central register of
property sales. However, this was mostly not the case in 2011. We are therefore limited in our
analysis to four states.
10Table A1 in the appendix provides detailed information on data definitions and sources.
11We only take into account vacancies in residential buildings, excluding hostels and nursing
homes as well as dwellings of diplomats and foreign armed forces. Vacancies occuring in buildings
for commercial use are not included.
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owner-occupied nor rented out on the Census reference day, excluding units tem-
porarily not inhabitated due to modernization or renovation.12 Using the overall
number of residential dwellings minus holiday homes in each locality as the de-
nominator, we compute very accurate, fine-grained data on local vacancy rates
allowing for a proper identification of a house price-vacancy relationship. The
municipal vacancy data covers the entire geography of all four analyzed states.
The vacancy rate variation across municipalities for which we observe SFH
transactions13 is substantial, ranging from 0% in several municipalities in Bran-
denburg, Lower Saxony and Rhineland-Palatinate to over 20% in some munici-
palities in Lower Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt. The average vacancy rate of mu-
nicipalities with SFH transactions in the dataset is 5.6% in Brandenburg, 3.9% in
Lower Saxony, 4.7% in Rhineland-Palatinate and 8.2% in Saxony-Anhalt. Figure
1 groups median house prices into thirty local vacancy rate bins, providing a first
rough glance at price-vacancy-relationships in each state.
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Figure 1: Median of vacancy rates and median home prices for 30 bins in four states (Branden-
burg, Lower Saxony, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saxony-Anhalt).
3.1 Property characteristics
The number of recorded property characteristics differs by state. The following
are available for all four: building type (detached house, semi-detached house,
12Unfortunately, cause and temporal duration of vacancy were not reported in the 2011 Ger-
man Census.
13312 municipalities in Brandenburg, 609 in Lower Saxony, 455 in Rhineland-Palatinate and
197 in Saxony-Anhalt.
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row house or row house end unit)14, lot size, floor space, year of construction, land
value of the lot, and the date of sale. For most transactions in Lower Saxony
and Saxony-Anhalt, we additionally have access to an ordinal indicator of the
quality of equipment. Further information available for some properties includes
the type of heating, existence of a cellar or garage, roof type, and further physical
characteristics.
Since the rate of vacancy is expected to strongly correlate with local location
quality, controlling for the quality of location is of utmost importance in our
analysis. For privacy protection reasons, we unfortunately cannot obtain infor-
mation on the exact geocoordinates of the properties, which prior research uses
to construct an index of location quality at the micro (property) level. We do
have information however on each individual property’s publicly registered land
value (Bodenrichtwert in German). The land value refers to the assessed mone-
tary value of the lot apart from the value of structures.15 Land value assessment
in Germany is conducted on an annual basis by the Local Committees of Val-
uation Experts.16 By including property-level land values in the hedonics, we
can directly control for a large battery of latent locational factors, such as the
accessibility of public transport and other amenities/disamenities.
Summary statistics for the main property characteristics are displayed in Ta-
ble 1. Median home sales prices range from 75,000 Euros in Saxony-Anhalt to
189,000 Euros in Rhineland-Palatinate. Detached houses account for the major-
ity of transactions in all four states, with shares ranging from 54% in Rhineland-
Palatinate and Saxony-Anhalt to 69% in Lower Saxony. Average living space
ranges from 115 (Saxony-Anhalt) to 142 square metres (Rhineland-Palatinate),
while average lot size ranges from slightly above 500 square metres (Rhineland-
Palatinate) to about 850 square metres (Brandenburg). Average building age
is lowest in Lower Saxony with 39 years and highest in Saxony-Anhalt with 70
years. The average land value in the data set ranges from 34 Euros per square
metre in Saxony-Anhalt to 172 Euros per square metre in Rhineland-Palatinate,
indicating substantial variation in average location quality across states.
14In Rhineland-Palatinate, a fifth property type „individual construction“ is reported for
properties that cannot be clearly assigned to one of the four other categories.
15For the U.S. case, Cohen et al. (2015) employ local polynonomial regressions to separate
land values from structure values, which encompasses the estimation of hedonic models.
16A variety of characteristics is taken into account, most importantly the quality of location
of the property: a longer distance to a city center, for example, decreases the land value. The
assessment is based on comparable market transactions and usually extends to several lots. For
areas without a sufficient number of comparables, which is typical for rural areas, the Valuation
Experts resort to subjective assessments.
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State
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Mean Median Minimum Maximum Mean Median Minimum Maximum Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Property characteristics
Transaction price (k Euro) 140.213 125.000 3.000 1,800.000 148.752 137.750 15.000 1,200.000 207.314 189.000 10.000 845.000 83.915 75.000 1.000 410.000
Lot size (m²) 858 748 61 8617 775 675 50 9,333 517 434 40 5,992 714 600 50 4140
Living space (m²) 118 115 30 505 136 128 50 450 142 136 3 1,675 115 110 28 423
Age (years) 46 33 0 311 39 38 0 161 47 41 0 511 70 72 0 475
Semi-detached house (dummy) 0.21 - 0 1 0.14 - 0 1 0.14 - 0 1 0.27 - 0 1
Detached house (dummy) 0.68 - 0 1 0.69 - 0 1 0.54 - 0 1 0.54 - 0 1
Row house end unit (dummy) 0.05 - 0 1 0.06 - 0 1 0.08 - 0 1 0.08 - 0 1
Row house (dummy) 0.06 - 0 1 0.11 - 0 1 0.18 - 0 1 0.11 - 0 1
Individual construction (dummy) - - - - - - - - 0.06 - 0 1 - - - -
Land value (Euro per m²) 59.86 49 0 400 86.16 75 0 550 171.81 170 0.60 705 33.82 25 5 180
Municipality characteristics
Vacancy rate 0.056 0.052 0 0.200 0.039 0.033 0 0.245 0.047 0.045 0 0.179 0.082 0.079 0.030 0.233
Inhabitants (thousands) 7.510 3.268 0.382 156.021 11.801 5.609 0.316 506.416 5.417 1.637 0.027 200.344 11.450 7.280 0.845 229.153
Population density (k of inhabitants per km²) 0.143 0.047 0.008 2.300 0.181 0.122 0.017 2.485 0.252 0.179 0.016 2.054 0.118 0.075 0.013 1.691
Per capita income (k of Euro) 10.760 10.020 6.727 25.210 14.062 13.792 8.342 29.138 15.270 14.722 4.772 66.462 10.175 9.952 7.033 16.307
Ratio SFH of total dwellings 0.53 0.56 0.11 0.82 0.53 0.55 0.12 0.84 0.54 0.56 0.16 0.94 0.47 0.50 0.09 0.75
Local property tax leverage factor 3.58 3.60 2.50 4.93 3.58 3.50 2.50 5.30 3.41 3.40 0.80 5.00 3.56 3.56 2.50 4.75
Local public spending per inhabitant (k Euro) - - - - 1.186 1.045 0.650 12.221 0.996 0.910 0.036 5.205 - - - -
Very central (dummy) 0.06 - 0 1 0.03 - 0 1 0.26 - 0 1 0.01 - 0 1
Central (dummy) 0.14 - 0 1 0.39 - 0 1 0.41 - 0 1 0.11 - 0 1
Peripheral (dummy) 0.28 - 0 1 0.48 - 0 1 0.27 - 0 1 0.71 - 0 1
Very peripheral (dummy) 0.52 - 0 1 0.10 - 0 1 0.06 - 0 1 0.17 - 0 1
Mostly urban (dummy) 0.13 - 0 1 0.17 - 0 1 0.34 - 0 1 0.10 - 0 1
Partly urban (dummy) 0.11 - 0 1 0.31 - 0 1 0.36 - 0 1 0.24 - 0 1
Rural (dummy) 0.76 - 0 1 0.52 - 0 1 0.30 - 0 1 0.66 - 0 1
Strongly growing (dummy) 0.11 - 0 1 0.15 - 0 1 0.13 - 0 1 0.01 - 0 1
Growing (dummy) 0.16 - 0 1 0.31 - 0 1 0.15 - 0 1 0.01 - 0 1
Stable (dummy) 0.01 - 0 1 0.16 - 0 1 0.16 - 0 1 0.01 - 0 1
Shrinking (dummy) 0.21 - 0 1 0.28 - 0 1 0.51 - 0 1 0.12 - 0 1
Severely shrinking (dummy) 0.51 - 0 1 0.10 - 0 1 0.05 - 0 1 0.85 - 0 1
BB LS RP SA
Table 1: Summary statistics on property characteristics and municipal variables. Lot size for BB is winsorized for one extreme value. Price for RP is winsorized for
one extreme value. Living space for RP is winsorized for three extreme values. Lot size for SA is winsorized for one extreme value. Building age is winsorized for SA
for 28 extreme values.
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3.2 Locational characteristics
We match our sales data with sociodemographic and economic information at the
municipality level from various sources. In addition to the residential vacancy
rate, we obtain from the 2011 Census the total size of local population and
population density. As a measure of local purchasing power, we use data on
the average taxable income per local resident from federal income tax statistics.
In order to account for a potential confounding role of local variation in fiscal
environments, we collect data on local property tax leverage factors for developed
land17, as well as on local public spending per capita. Data on local property
tax leverage factors is obtained from property tax statistics, whereas data on
public spending comes from municipal budget statistics. In order to account for
structural differences between locations, we finally collect data on the spatial
centrality, the settlement type and the long-term growth performance of each
municipality from the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs
and Spatial Development (BBSR).18
A quick glance at Table 1 shows that the four analyzed states differ consid-
erably with regard to local market characteristics. Mean population density and
per capita income are considerably higher in the two western German states. Two
thirds of all municipalities in Rhineland-Palatinate are classified as central or very
central, whereas the corresponding shares in the three other states range from 12%
in Saxony-Anhalt to 42% in Lower Saxony, indicating much larger proportions of
peripheral municipalities. Another important difference relates to municipalities’
long-term demographic and socio-economic development: Lower Saxony is the
only state for which the number of growing or stable locations outranks that of
shrinking ones in terms of total population, young-adult population, employment
and public revenues. Even as much as 97% of municipalities in Saxony-Anhalt
are shrinking or severely shrinking (Brandenburg: 72%, Rhineland-Palatinate:
56%). These large structural differences make us confident that our main results
hold in very different market contexts.
Municipalities also differ between states in average size. About two thirds
of all municipalities in Rhineland-Palatinate are very small, having less than
400 housing units. In Brandenburg, Lower Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt, the size
distribution is somewhat more even, with the largest proportion of municipalities
comprising less than 600 housing units (with relatively high proportions of larger
municipalities).19
Figures 2-5 illustrate the geographic distributions of vacancy rates and the
total number of SFH transactions observed in each municipality for all four states,
with circle sizes being proportional to the number of sales:
17Grundsteuer B in German.
18Table A1 in the appendix describes these three variables in more detail.
19See Figures A1-A4 in the appendix for histograms of municipality size.
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Figure 2: Spatial distribution of vacancy rates and SFH transactions in municipalities in Bran-
denburg in 2011. Transactions are recorded in 312 of 419 municipalities.
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Figure 3: Spatial distribution of vacancy rates and SFH transactions in municipalities in Lower
Saxony in 2011. Transactions are recorded in 609 of 1,008 municipalities.
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Figure 4: Spatial distribution of vacancy rates and SFH transactions in municipalities in
Rhineland-Palatinate in 2011. Transactions are recorded in 455 of 2,306 municipalities.
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Figure 5: Spatial distribution of vacancy rates and SFH transactions in municipalities in Saxony-
Anhalt in 2011. Transactions are recorded in 197 of 219 municipalities.
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4 Identification
We aim at identifying a monotonous home price-vacancy relationship by employ-
ing standard hedonic house price regressions (Rosen, 1974; Sheppard, 1999). We
estimate:
log(pi,m) = α+
J∑
j=1
βjxji + γlog(vm) +
K∑
k=1
δkzki,m + ui,m
ui,m ∼ N (0, σ)
(1)
where pi,m denotes the selling price of property i in municipality m, xji is
a j-dimensional vector comprising property attributes, vm is the vacancy rate
in municipality m and zki,m reflects municipality-level controls.20 We assume
heteroscedastic random disturbances. Due to the two-layered structure of our
dataset, we cluster standard errors at the municipality level to take account of
error correlation within groups (Moulton, 1990; Wooldridge, 2010). Our main
interest pertains to:
γ = ∂log(pi,m)
∂log(vm)
= ∂pi,m
∂vm
· vm
pi,m
, (2)
the sample mean elasticity of sales prices with respect to the municipal vacancy
rate conditional on the included covariates. The respective samples are large
enough to allow estimation of Equation (1) separately by state.
Our ultimate goal is to establish causality regarding the effect of higher local
vacancy rates on SFH prices. We thus need to carefully address the questions
of omitted variables and potential endogeneity of vacancy. In addition to exten-
sively controlling for physical property characteristics, we rigorously control for
location-quality differences by including the property-specific assessed land val-
ues and the municipality-specific indicators of centrality, settlement structure and
long-term demographic and economic prospects. Endogeneity could arise from
reverse causality: the observation of low market values may incentivize owners to
leave their homes vacant. Potential resulting bias can be resolved by instrumental
variables estimation. After discussing results of the baseline model in Subsection
5.1, we address the problem of endogeneity among other checks for robustness in
Subsection 5.2.
20Given ample empirical evidence that seasonality affects the residential real estate markets
in the U.K. and the U.S. (Ngai and Tenreyro, 2014), we experimented with dummy variables
indicating the quarter of the transaction date. As we did not find any significant partial effect
of seasonality on selling prices in our sample for any state, we do not include time dummies in
the specification. Results including quarter dummies are available upon request.
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5 Econometric Results
5.1 Baseline Model
Results of state-by-state estimations of Equation (1) are displayed in Table 2.
All continuous right-hand side variables are mean-centered. Due to the differing
number of property characteristics included in each state-specific regression be-
yond the common basic variables, we do not list the coefficients of all attributes
but only report coefficients for the basic set of property-level controls for which
we have information in each state. We winsorized some variables to account for
the influence of extreme values.21
Goodness of fit for the baseline specifications is satisfactory: adjusted R2-
values range from 0.65 in Rhineland-Palatinate to 0.74 in Lower Saxony, indicat-
ing that only a minor share of variation in selling prices remains unexplained.
Most importantly, strongly significant inverse relationships between individual
selling prices and local vacancy rates are found for all states, as suggested by the-
ory (for Saxony-Anhalt, the effect is barely significant at the 10%-level). Accord-
ing to the estimates, a doubling of the vacancy rate in a municipality implies an
average decrease in quality-controlled sales prices of 5-8%, dependent on state.22
These estimates amount to considerable economic effects: at the state-specific
mean local vacancy rate, a doubling of vacancy implies a 9,700 euros sales price
discount for a typical (average-priced) home in Brandenburg, 10,400 euros in
Lower Saxony, 15,000 euros in Rhineland-Palatinate and 5,900 euros in Saxony-
Anhalt. Largely invariant to geography, the resulting percentage elasticity of
sales prices to local vacancy is close to -0.1—strikingly mimicking the well-known
elasticity of individual workers’ wages to aggregate local unemployment in labor
markets.
Concerning statistical control, the coefficients estimated on property charac-
teristics are generally significant and carry plausible signs. Semi-detached houses,
row houses and homes of individual construction type tend to sell at lower prices
than otherwise comparable detached houses, particularly so for row houses. Big-
ger lot sizes and more living space have the expected positive effects on sales
prices. Consistent with existing research on housing price hedonics, the relation
between selling price and age is U-shaped according to our estimates, indicat-
ing a vintage effect in home values.23 Higher assessed land values, which reflect
21Full results, including coefficients on all property characteristics for Brandenburg, Lower
Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt, are listed in Table A2 in the appendix.
22In a strict sense, the logarithm with base two would be a more exact way to determine
the effect of a doubling of the vacancy rate. In order to make our results directly comparable
to the wage curve literature, we stick to the conventional log-log specification using natural
logarithms and approximate the effect of a doubling in the vacancy rate by multiplying the
reported coefficients by 0.6931, which is the difference between the natural logarithm of a number
and the natural logarithm of the number’s double value.
23The turning points for the baseline models are very large, however: 140 years in BB, 120
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State BB LS RP SA
Variable
Lot size (m²)   0.000017*   0.000123***   0.000194***   0.000209***
 (0.000009)  (0.000025)  (0.000045)  (0.000028)
Living space (m²)   0.005972***   0.002793***   0.003535***   0.004041***
 (0.000273)  (0.000194)  (0.000279)  (0.000591)
Age (years)  -0.007538***  -0.009336***  -0.006505***  -0.004885***
 (0.000416)  (0.000636)  (0.000440)  (0.000286)
Age squared   0.000027**   0.000039***   0.000015***   0.000013***
 (0.000012)  (0.000011)  (0.000000)  (0.000000)
Semi-detached house (dummy)  -0.110702***  -0.082331***  -0.080268***   0.038174
 (0.023410)  (0.021941)  (0.024052)  (0.032361)
Row house end unit (dummy)  -0.334135***  -0.207371***  -0.094348***  -0.126463***
 (0.057144)  (0.030815)  (0.024206)  (0.046543)
Row house (dummy)  -0.359443***  -0.179267***  -0.176109***  -0.101679**
 (0.050525)  (0.027107)  (0.027401)  (0.047684)
Individual construction (dummy) - -  -0.112581** -
- -  (0.044543) -
Further building characteristics controlled yes yes no yes
Land value (Euro per m²)   0.002894***   0.003257***   0.002501***   0.009712***
 (0.000458)  (0.000288)  (0.000174)  (0.001343)
Log of vacancy rate  -0.103369**  -0.077700***  -0.115598***  -0.083429*
 (0.043830)  (0.021815)  (0.032039)  (0.047308)
Inhabitants (thousands)   0.000707  -0.001147**    0.000106   0.002719
 (0.000752)  (0.000498)  (0.000529)  (0.001681)
Population density (k inhabitants per km²)   0.333660***   0.033489  -0.101654**   0.069839
 (0.064657)  (0.073548)  (0.041207)  (0.183784)
Population density squared  -0.214914***  -0.179961***    -0.073296  -1.084909***
 (0.061461)  (0.042597)  (0.044624)  (0.333186)
Per capita income (k Euro)   0.027525***   0.034322***   0.002713   0.014736
 (0.007981)  (0.004683)  (0.003895)  (0.012388)
Local property tax leverage factor (percent)   0.033164  -0.011396   0.101506***   0.028602
 (0.051551)  (0.020197)  (0.038171)  (0.048046)
Local public spending per inhabitant (k Euro) -   0.054108***   0.082079** -
-  (0.019332)  (0.035253) -
Constant  11.295008***  11.737404***  12.182819***  11.225707***
 (0.101222)  (0.064812)  (0.021486)  (0.139925)
AIC 2,478.37 285.96 872.76 1,979.29
BIC 2,576.51 529.35 966.86 2,084.61
Adjusted R² 0.674164 0.740878 0.646972 0.650050
Number of observations 2,375 1,866 1,874 1,888
Dependent variable: log of transaction price * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Table 2: Baseline regression results. Continuous variables are mean-centered. Standard errors
reported in parentheses are cluster-robust clustering at the municipality level. The reference
category for property type is „detached house“. Lot size for BB is winsorized for one extreme
value. Price for RP is winsorized for one extreme value. Living space for RP is winsorized
for three extreme values. Lot size for SA is winsorized for one extreme value. Building age is
winsorized for SA for 28 extreme values.
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higher qualities of micro location, are associated with higher sales prices. Includ-
ing municipality-level indicators of location quality (as described in Section 3.2)
instead of property-level land values yields significant coefficients with plausible
signs (see Table A3 in the appendix). The coefficients turn insignificant once
property-specific land values are added to the model.24
The evidence for municipality-level controls is somewhat mixed across the
four states. We do not find consistent significance for municipality size, popula-
tion density, the squared value of population density and the local property tax
level. In line with housing being a normal good, SFH tend to sell at higher prices
were per capita income is higher: the corresponding coefficient is significant for
Brandenburg and Lower Saxony. Local public spending also tends to be posi-
tively associated with individual sales prices while simultaneously controlling for
property tax and income levels. This result is likely to reflect that municipalities
spending heavily on local public goods generate positive externalities, although
caution is warranted due to the incomplete control of local variation in service
fee and non-property tax levels.
Since many additional property characteristics contain missing values across
different observations, we run alternative specifications that only include the most
basic property-level characteristics along with the municipal vacancy rate as re-
gressors.25 This allows approximately doubling the sample size for Lower Saxony
and enlarging it by several hundreds of observations for Brandenburg and Saxony-
Anhalt.26 Goodness of fit measures indicate that the group of basic property
attributes alone already explains a great deal of variation in house prices. More
importantly, the coefficients estimated on the vacancy rate remain unchanged
concerning their economic magnitude and statistical significance.
5.2 Robustness Checks
We run several robustness checks concerning the sensitivity of our main result
to changes in model specification, the exclusion of multivariate outliers, and to
accounting for potential endogeneity of the vacancy rate. We additionally perform
randomized out-of-sample predictions to investigate the external validity of the
regression results.
years in LS, 217 in RP and 188 years in SA.
24The adjusted goodness of fit rises by about five percentage points when using property-level
land values alone.
25Results are reported in Table A4 in the appendix.
26from N=1,866 to N=3,464 for LS, from N=2,375 to N=2,850 for BB and from N=1,888 to
N=2,478 for SA.
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Model Specification
Every model specification must necessarily be partly driven by subjective con-
siderations and may therefore be put into question. For example, higher powers
or interactions of variables may be omitted from the specification despite their
true relevance, leading to omitted variables bias. Belloni et al. (2014) recently
suggests the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator („LASSO“) as
a purely data-driven approach of model specification.27 The procedure chooses
covariates by means of a maximization algorithm that aims at identifying the
specification with the best out-of-sample prediction properties from the data.
We use LASSO to check the validity of our choice of variables and the robustness
of the link between sales prices and local vacancies to the inclusion of powers and
(multiple) interaction terms between variables. Compared to the baseline model,
the relationship between house prices and the rate of vacancy remains largely
unchanged, becoming somewhat less pronounced in absolute terms in Rhineland-
Palatinate. Only for Saxony-Anhalt, the effect we find is not anymore statistically
different from zero.28
Influential Observations
In a second robustness check, we take into consideration potential bias from in-
fluential observations and multivariate outliers. We already used winsorizing to
make observations with obvious errors or inaccuracies in one or more variables
suitable for regression analysis.29 We additionally resort to Cook’s D (Cook and
Weisberg, 1982) in order to scan the data for multivariate influential outliers and
exclude suspicious observations from the regressions. Table A6 in the appendix
reports specifications identical to the baseline regression model in Table 2, with-
out observations associated with Cook’s D values larger than the recommended
threshold of 4/N. Our main result remains qualitatively unchanged in each state.
Instrumental Variable Approach
The local vacancy rate potentially suffers from an endogeneity problem in our
baseline specification. First, despite controlling for a battery of property- and
municipality-level characteristics, there may be latent unobserved factors corre-
lated with local vacancies that also influence individual house prices. Second,
a reverse causality issue may arise from incentives to leave houses vacant when
27The procedure has been implemented with the user-written command „lassoShooting“ in
Stata.
28Table A5 in the appendix reports the outcome of the LASSO procedure, with the vacancy
rate as ex ante fixed variable with controls selected by Lasso included but not shown.
29Through winsorizing, extremely high or low variable values are replaced by the next-smallest
or next-largest value from another observation in the data set.
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nearby house prices are low. It is important to note that reverse causality is not
seen as a serious problem in most of the wage curve literature: as Nijkamp and
Poot (2005) point out in a review, less than ten percent of empirical studies on
the wage curve include instrumental variables. The reason is that it is unlikely
that random shocks to a micro outcome (a labor contract or the price negotiated
in an individual home transaction) unfold any systematic feedback effects on a
macro variable (the local aggregate unemployment or housing vacancy rate).
In order to infer whether the observed downward-sloping curve among sell-
ing prices and vacancies is indeed conducive to a causal interpretation, we use
information on long-lagged historical local vacancy. Historical data contains ex-
ogenous variation in vacancies that must necessarily be unrelated to contempo-
raneous shocks to selling prices. This approach again has its analogy in the wage
curve literature, where lagged unemployment rates are often used as instruments
for current ones (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2005). The exclusion restriction is
that lagged vacancy rates have an impact on current SFH transaction prices no
other than through the channel of being correlated to current levels of vacancy.
For western Germany, the last historical Census providing detailed data on va-
cant dwellings was conducted in 1987, while the according year is 1995 for eastern
Germany. The vacancy computation method has been comparable in all three
years.30 It seems plausible that vacancy rates are persistent over time, suggesting
pronounced correlations between vacancy rates in 1987/1995 and 2011. Indeed,
the bivariate correlation between the two variables for municipalities in which we
observe home transactions in 2011 ranges from 0.189 for Rhineland-Palatinate to
0.360 in Lower Saxony. This indicates potential instrument relevance, which we
test in the first stage.
Table 3 shows the output from a two-stage least squares regression of the
baseline model with municipal vacancy rates in 1987/1995 used as instruments
for 2011 vacancy rates. In the first stage regressions, historical vacancy rates
always carry the expected positive signs and are statistically significant at the ten
percent level or better for three of four states. The p-value of the instrumented
vacancy rate in the second stage indicates significance only for Brandenburg.
Most importantly, robust score tests never reject the null of contemporaneous
vacancy rates being exogenous to individual price shocks for all four states. This
result is in line with the view that random deviations in prices negotiated in
individual home transactions are unlikely to exhibit feedback effects on local
vacancy rates theirselves.31 Against this background, the IV exercise suggests
30In each Census wave, dwelling owners were asked whether their dwelling was currently
owner-occupied, rented out, a holiday or recreational home, or vacant. Short-term, interim
vacant homes due to renovation, modernization or tenant moves were not counted as vacant in
each Census wave. For each Census year, we subtract all holiday and recreational homes from
the total number of local dwellings in the calculation of local vacancy rates.
31For Saxony-Anhalt, this result must be treated with care due to the instrument being weak.
20
that our main result survives potential endogeneity of current vacancy and lends
itself to a causal interpretation.
External Validity
We finally assess the external validity of the regression results. To this end,
we employ out-of-sample predictions of sales prices by randomly excluding five
percent of transactions from all four samples and re-estimating the model for
each state. We predict sales prices for the excluded cases based on the coefficients
obtained by estimating the baseline regression (Table 2). Figures A5-A8 in the
appendix illustrate the resulting scatterplots of actual against predicted selling
prices. We see that our model performs generally well in predicting out-of-sample
sales prices.
6 Time Persistence of Local Housing Vacancies
If higher vacancies indeed induce lower sales prices, high-vacancy areas become
relatively more attractive to buyers. In competitive and frictionless housing mar-
kets, this mechanism would ensure elevated vacancies to return to normal levels.
In view of the empirical evidence in favor of a negatively sloped house-price
vacancy curve, the extent to which vacancies in local housing markets are time-
persistent is therefore a crucial question from a wider economic perspective: even
if vacancies are associated with negative price signals, adjustment through dis-
investment or an influx of new buyers may take decades due to the extreme
durability of housing (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005). Policy intervention becomes
a viable option once housing markets fail to clear even in the long-run despite
economically „correct“ price signals of elevated vacancies.
Recent research on local housing dynamics indeed shows housing markets to
be much less liquid than other asset markets and failing to easily re-equilibrate
in response to shocks (Zabel, 2014).32 For the labor market (another market
requiring search and matching), Blanchard et al. (1992) show regional unemploy-
ment rates in U.S. states to be time-persistent, with labor mobility (not real wage
declines) eventually leading them to return to initial levels after random shocks.
Similar adjustment can be severely impeded in the housing market due to the
immobility and indivisibility of properties, high transaction costs (Haurin and
Gill, 2002) and downward-inelastic supply (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005; Maennig
and Dust, 2008). Much as labor markets, housing moreover exhibits downward
stickiness in prices (Genesove and Mayer, 2001)
To address these questions, we empirically test whether there are systematic
32Earlier, DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994) and Riddel (2004) have provided evidence that
housing markets exhibit extended periods of disequilibrium.
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State BB LS RP SA
Variable
Lot size (m²)   0.000017*   0.000127***   0.000206***   0.000210***
 (0.000010)  (0.000025)  (0.000049)  (0.000027)
Living space (m²)   0.006044***   0.002791***   0.003512***   0.004081***
 (0.000273)  (0.000192)  (0.000287)  (0.000596)
Age (years)  -0.007397***  -0.009628***  -0.006600***  -0.005010***
 (0.000427)  (0.000671)  (0.000463)  (0.000337)
Age squared   0.000026**   0.000038***   0.000015***   0.000013***
 (0.000012)  (0.000011)  (0.000002)  (0.000001)
Semi-detached house (dummy)  -0.105637***  -0.085959***  -0.077578***   0.056434
 (0.024273)  (0.022316)  (0.024151)  (0.037854)
Row house end unit (dummy)  -0.323631***  -0.212546***  -0.089775***  -0.104055**
 (0.057913)  (0.031276)  (0.024458)  (0.050301)
Row house (dummy)  -0.351832***  -0.182474***  -0.172292***  -0.096258**
 (0.050732)  (0.026238)  (0.026525)  (0.047684)
Individual construction (dummy) - -  -0.112152** -
- -  (0.046301) -
Further building characteristics controlled yes yes no yes
Land value (Euro per m²)   0.002958***   0.003446***   0.002665***   0.008693***
 (0.000389)  (0.000311)  (0.000274)  (0.001611)
Log of vacancy rate  -0.242725*   0.016136   0.019362  -0.531868
 (0.134153)  (-0.064321)  (0.179620)  (0.430973)
Inhabitants (thousands)   0.000434   0.000995**   0.000306   0.003467
 (0.000809)  (0.000458)  (0.000631)  (0.002170)
Population density (k inhabitants per km²)   0.300131***   0.054894  -0.060478   0.323927
 (0.080175)  (0.070672)  (0.068819)  (0.361649)
Population density squared  -0.173772**  -0.163311***  -0.095089  -1.522743***
 (0.070296)  (0.038276)  (0.059794)  (0.578058)
Per capita income (k Euro)   0.011659   0.039912***   0.004242  -0.023609
 (0.016280)  (0.005772)  (0.004988)  (0.039781)
Local property tax leverage factor (percent)   0.052511  -0.021448   0.079488*   0.066632
 (0.054665)  (0.020464)  (0.045774)  (0.080494)
Local public spending per inhabitant (k Euro) -   0.039021*   0.047258 -
-  (0.020221)  (0.063448) -
Constant  11.483411***  11.745434***  12.189965***  11.654802***
 (0.194680)  (0.068392)  (0.025579)  (0.450878)
AIC - - - -
BIC - - - -
Adjusted R² 0.668773 0.736019 0.643112 0.622781
Number of observations 2,375 1,853 1,861 1,888
Dependent variable: log of transaction price                      * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Robust regression-based test statistic of vacancy rate in 2011 being exogenous:
BB: F(1, 285) = 0.74384 (p = 0.3892)
LS: F(1, 435) = 2.63153 (p = 0.1055)
RP: F(1, 434) = 0.64524 (p = 0.4223)
SA: F(1, 175) = 1.98349 (p = 0.1608)
Table 3: Instrumental Variable regression results of the second stage, where the vacancy rate
in 2011 is instrumented by the vacancy rate in 1987 for western states and 1995 for eastern
states. All continuous variables are mean centered. Standard errors reported in parentheses
are cluster-robust clustering at the municipality level. The reference category for property type
is „detached house“. Lot size for BB is winsorized for one extreme value. Lot size for SA is
winsorized for extreme high value. Building age is winsorized for SA for 28 extreme values.
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patterns of persistence in housing vacancies at the municipal level over time.33
To this end, we again use the information on historical small-scale vacancy rates
in the four different states compiled in previous censuses. Table 4 shows state-by-
state results for a straightforward quantitative test of vacancy persistence over
time: a regression of the 2011 vacancy rate on historical rates and a set of indica-
tor variables capturing structural differences between municipalities in terms of
centrality, settlement type, and long-term growth. For the two eastern states, we
additionally include a dummy variable that reflects whether a municipality par-
ticipated in federal urban redevelopment programs (Stadtumbau Ost in German)
during the time period of 1995 and 2011.
State BB LS RP SA
Dep. Var. V 2011 V 2011 V 2011 V 2011
V 1987/95 0.1637*** 0.4909*** 0.1014* 0.3193***
Constant -0.0300*** 0.0658*** -0.0347*** -0.0105*
Controlling for:
Settlement type yes yes yes yes
Growth type yes yes yes yes
Centrality yes yes yes yes
Urban redev. yes no no yes
R2 0.2292 0.3178 0.0293 0.1952
N 419 1006 2304 219
Table 4: Testing for time persistence in municipal vacancy rates in the states of Brandenburg
(BB), Lower Saxony (LS), Rhineland-Palatinate (RP) and Saxony-Anhalt (SA). Regressions
control for three different settlement types (rural to urban), five different growth types (fastly
growing to strongly shrinking) and four different centrality types (very central to very periph-
eral), in Brandenburg and Saxony Anhalt additionally for participation in federal urban rede-
velopment programs. *,**,*** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%-level based
on Huber-White robust standard errors.
All state panels reveal strictly positive partial correlations among contempo-
raneous and historical vacancy rates, displayed as differences from the sample
mean in the respective years. The regression coefficients are statistically sig-
nificant throughout, ranging between 0.10 in Rhineland-Palatinate and 0.49 in
Lower Saxony. The evidence thus strongly supports the notion of strong temporal
persistence in housing vacancy rates: housing markets in below-average vacancy
municipalities in 1987/1995 remain comparatively strong, whereas municipalities
with above-average historical vacancies do not close the gap within time periods
33To our knowledge, similar work has so far been carried out only for local office markets,
typically guided by some a priori assumptions about the dynamic behaviour of vacancy derived
from structural models (Grenadier, 1995). Despite its obvious relevance for policy, the question
of persistence in small-scale housing vacancy rates over time has hardly been tackled by empirical
work.
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of several decades.34 The evidence thus corroborates the assumption that small-
scale housing markets do not work efficiently when it comes to dealing with excess
supply: price discounts associated with higher rates of local vacancy are appar-
ently not strong enough to raise demand to sufficient levels and eventually bring
back vacancy to state-normal levels.35
7 Conclusions
This study has investigated the role of nearby residential vacancies in the price
determination of single-family homes. Based on a review of theoretical and em-
pirical papers on housing market search and matching and housing externalities,
the key hypothesis of a house price-vacancy curve—a systematic inverse associ-
ation between individual selling prices and vacancies in the neighborhood—was
developed that is invariant to geography and therefore represents a symmetric
case of the well-established concept of a wage curve in labor economics. Based
on data on more than 10,000 single-family home sales in four different German
states, spatially granular vacancy rates and further local characteristics, first-
time empirical evidence has been provided in favor of the existence of such a
fundamental relationship. The quantitative link between local vacancy rates and
individual home prices turns out to be strikingly similar across the four states:
when the vacancy rate in a municipality doubles, quality-controlled single-family
home prices decrease by about 5-8%. The full economic costs of elevated vacancy
rates are likely to be underestimated by these price effects alone, given that high
vacancies are associated with increased marketing time and may even completely
forestall economically desirable sales.
Our key finding poses a striking but previously undocumented analogy to the
wage curve in labor economics, a concept that captures the quantitative effect
of variation in local unemployment on individual wages. The elasticity of wages
with respect to aggregate local unemployment has long been documented for
many countries, is of very similar magnitude and is referred to as an empirical
law in economics (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2005). A similar elasticity of home
prices to local vacancies lends further support to the idea that housing markets
34As a numerical example, two thirds of all municipalities in Saxony Anhalt had either above
or below-average vacancy rates in both 1995 and 2011. For a similar result on local office
markets, see Grenadier (1995).
35Zabel (2014) recently provides similar evidence for larger-scale (U.S. metropolitan) housing
markets. Against the background of shrinking and aging populations in many industrialized
economies (especially in rural areas), the question arises to what extent such findings imply the
possibility of a downward spiral of low selling prices making properties in high-vacancy areas
even less attractive for potential investors and hence generating local populations to decline
further, leading to even more vacant houses. Our paper only gives a first hint in this regard by
highlighting the substantial time-persistence of local vacancy rates despite the empirical fact of
a price discount of higher vacancies. Policymakers should watch high-vacancy areas carefully
and potentially implement ways to correct permanent housing market disequilibria.
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are best analyzed in terms of search, bargaining and matching instead of perfect
competition. This matches a key second stylized fact we have reported in this
paper: the fact that local housing vacancy distributions display strong persistence
over fairly long time horizons despite the presence of sales price discounts through
higher vacancies. This persistence can be interpreted as a sign of market failure
that leaves room for policy intervention. Molloy (2016) points out recently that
because locations with unusually high vacancy tend to be fairly heterogeneous,
the efficacy of policies aimed at reducing local vacancy rates will depend on the
type of neighborhood being considered.
As with any empirical study, there are limitations that must be put on the
results of this paper. Although we manage to control for a large number of pos-
sibly confounding factors, as well as for potential endogeneity of local vacancy
rates, the question of whether the results allow establishing any definite state-
ment about causality remains necessarily controversial. We nevertheless remain
confident that a robust empirical link between individual house prices and local
vacancies provides a useful foundation for further research: first and foremost, it
would be highly interesting to extend the analysis to other countries with different
housing market designs. Further research may also examine whether the observed
relationship holds for other types of housing, such as non-regulated rental housing
or owner-occupied apartments. In terms of discriminating among potential chan-
nels that generate a house price-vacancy curve, it looks promising to investigate
more deeply whether systematic differences exist in the empirical sensitivity of
house prices to local vacancy between homes of different age or type. Compara-
ble research in the labor market literature has suggested systematic differences in
wage sensitivity to unemployment according to workers’ age or gender (Nijkamp
and Poot, 2005; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2005). Finally, random-assignment
experimental research could shed further light on the question of whether infor-
mation on local vacancy rates causally affects individual bargaining behavior and
eventually translates into different sales prices.
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Figure A1: Histogram Brandenburg
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Figure A2: Histogram Lower Saxony
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Figure A3: Histogram Rhineland-Palatinate
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Figure A4: Histogram Saxony-Anhalt
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Figure A5: Out-of-sample-prediction for a 5% subsample of observations in Brandenburg, based
on the specification used for the baseline results in Table 2.
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Figure A6: Out-of-sample-prediction for a 5% subsample of observations in Lower Saxony, based
on the specification used for the baseline results in Table 2.
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Figure A7: Out-of-sample-prediction for a 5% subsample of observations in Rhineland-
Palatinate, based on the specification used for the baseline results in Table 2.
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Figure A8: Out-of-sample-prediction for a 5% subsample of observations in Saxony-Anhalt,
based on the specification used for the baseline results in Table 2.
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Variable Definition Source
Property characteristics
Transaction price Transaction price of SFH in Euro
Lot size Lot size of SFH in m²
Living space Living space of SFH in m²
Age Building age of SFH in years
Land value Publicly registered land value of a lot in Euro per m²
Type of building indicators Indicator for detached, semi-detached and row houses
Municipality characteristics
Vacancy rate Ratio of vacant dwellings to total dwellings less holiday homes Censuses 1987, 1995 and 2011, Federal Statistical Office
Inhabitants Number of inhabitants in thousands Census 2011, Federal Statistical Office
Population density Number of inhabitants in thousands per km² Census 2011, Federal Statistical Office
Per capita income Taxable income per inhabitant in thousands of Euros in 2007 Income tax statistics, Federal Statistical Office
Ratio SFH of total dwellings Percentage of SFHs relative to all dwellings Census 2011, Federal Statistical Office
Local property tax leverage factor Local property tax leverage factor (Grundsteuer B) in percent Tax leverage factor statistics (Hebesätze
der Realsteuern), Federal Statistical Office
Local public spending per inhabitant Local public spending per inhabitant in thousands of Euros Municipality budget statistics (vierteljährliche
Kassenstatistik der Gemeinden), Federal Statistical Office
Urban redevelopment Dummy for participation of a municipality in the urban
redevelopment program "Stadtumbau Ost"
Ministry for Infrastructure and Regional Planning 
Brandenburg, Ministry for Regional Development and
Transport Saxony-Anhalt
Location type Classification of municipalities into "very central", "central", 
"peripheral" or "very peripheral"
Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs 
and Spatial Development (Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- 
und Raumforschung, short BBSR)
Settlement type Classification of municipalities into "mostly urban", "partly 
urban" or "rural"
Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs 
and Spatial Development (Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- 
und Raumforschung, short BBSR)
Growth type Classification of municipalities into "strongly growing", 
"growing", "stable", "shrinking" or "severely shrinking"
Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs 
and Spatial Development (Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- 
und Raumforschung, short BBSR)
Superior Committees of Valuation
Experts of Lower Saxony,
Rhineland-Palatinate and Saxony-Anhalt
}
Table A1: Data definitions and sources. All data are for 2011, unless stated otherwise.
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State BB LS SA
Variable
Lot size (m²)   0.000017*   0.000123***   0.000209***
Living space (m²)   0.005972***   0.002793***   0.004041***
Age (years)  -0.007538***  -0.009336***  -0.004885***
Age squared   0.000027**   0.000039***   0.000013***
Semi-detached house (dummy)  -0.110702***  -0.082331***   0.038174
Row house end unit (dummy)  -0.334135***  -0.207371***  -0.126463***
Row house (dummy)  -0.359443***  -0.179267***  -0.101679**
Individual construction (dummy) - - -
Land value (Euro per m²)   0.002894***   0.003257***   0.009712***
Roof type "octagonal" -   0.111037 -
Roof type "rainbow roof" - - -
Roof type "flat roof" -   0.024393 -
Roof type "mansard roof" -   0.092952 -
Roof type "monopitch roof" -  -0.052227 -
Roof type "hip roof" -   0.035553* -
Roof type "tented roof, conical roof, dome roof" -  -0.056672 -
Roof type "other roof type" -  -0.040329 -
Attic in place -   0.011735 -
Prefabricated house -  -0.026893 -
Garage or parking space in place -  -0.018231 -
Quality of windows "elaborate" -   0.031855 -
Quality of windows "simple" -  -0.101604*** -
Regional type "tourist center" -  -0.057703 -
Regional type "city fringe area" -  -0.030531 -
Regional type "cities and Oberzentren" -   0.099950** -
Regional type "Grundzentren" -   0.054521*** -
Regional type "Mittelzentren" -   0.051172** -
Refurbishment status "few modernisation works" -  -0.017192 -
Refurbishment status "average" -   0.020376 -
Refurbishment status "largely modernised" -   0.014675 -
Transaction took place between natural persons -   0.071969 -
General equipment standard "basic" -  -0.200398***  -0.588587***
General equipment standard "basic to average" -  -0.129237***  -0.408338***
General equipment standard "average to upscale" -   0.098124***   0.196788***
General equipment standard "upscale" -   0.166640***   0.331086***
General equipment standard "upscale to highly upscale" -   0.597727***   0.124852*
General equipment standard "highly upscale" -   0.284003*** -
Celler (at least 50 percent of building area)   0.105908*** - -
Number of floors   0.038005 - -
Log of vacancy rate  -0.103369**  -0.077700***  -0.083429*
Inhabitants (thousands)   0.000707  -0.001147**    0.002719
Population density (k inhabitants per km²)   0.333660***   0.033489   0.069839
Population density squared  -0.214914***  -0.179961***    -1.084909***
Per capita income (k Euro)   0.027525***   0.034322***   0.014736
Local property tax leverage factor (percent)   0.033164  -0.011396   0.028602
Local public spending per inhabitant (k Euro) -   0.054108*** -
Constant  11.295008***  11.737404***  11.225707***
AIC 2,478.37 285.96 1,979.29
BIC 2,576.51 529.35 2,084.61
Adjusted R² 0.674164 0.740878 0.650050
Number of observations 2.375 1.866 1.888
Dependent variable: log of transaction price * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Table A2: Baseline regression results, full results. All continuous variables are mean centered.
Standard errors reported in parentheses are cluster-robust clustering at the municipality level.
The reference category for property type is „detached house“. The reference category for roof
type is „saddle roof, half-hip roof“. The reference category for quality of windows is „average“.
The reference category for location type is „villages“. The reference category for refurbishment
status is „not modernised“. The reference category for general equipment standard is „average“.
Lot size for BB is winsorized for one extreme value. Lot size for SA is winsorized for one extreme
value. Building age is winsorized for SA for 28 extreme values.
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State BB LS RP SA
Variable
Lot size (m²)   0.000018   0.000101***   0.000180***   0.000157***
 (0.000011)  (0.000024)  (0.000047)  (0.000028)
Living space (m²)   0.006243***   0.003052***   0.004022***   0.004434***
 (0.000299)  (0.000205)  (0.000294)  (0.000630)
Age (years)  -0.007814***  -0.009182***  -0.007100***  -0.005681***
 (0.000491)  (0.000615)  (0.000473)  (0.000376)
Age squared   0.000032**   0.000036***   0.000016***   0.000015***
 (0.000013)  (0.000011)  (0.000000)  (0.000000)
Semi-detached house (dummy)  -0.082110***  -0.070626***  -0.070250**   0.055686
 (0.022702)  (0.022158)  (0.028406)  (0.034710)
Row house end unit (dummy)  -0.280650***  -0.213048***  -0.037870  -0.103499**
 (0.067685)  (0.025480)  (0.031965)  (0.049893)
Row house (dummy)  -0.304809***  -0.162079***  -0.133665***  -0.049937
 (0.046846)  (0.027777)  (0.033425)  (0.051967)
Individual construction (dummy) - -  -0.184563*** -
- -  (0.046684) -
Further building characteristics controlled yes yes no yes
Log of vacancy rate  -0.059390  -0.113290***  -0.218059***  -0.154593***
 (0.038309)  (0.020639)  (0.042116)  (0.048394)
Central (location type dummy)  -0.037694  -0.098274*  -0.1298552**  -0.123935*
 (0.041434)  (0.054580)  (0.051223)  (0.067392)
Peripheral (location type dummy)  -0.154150**  -0.182095***  -0.191244***  -0.142547***
 (0.065928)  (0.061716)  (0.062139)  (0.050409)
Very peripheral (location type dummy)  -0.266934***  -0.153796**  -0.187242** -
 (0.072696)  (0.075278)  (0.088882) -
Partly urban (settlement type dummy)   0.051612   0.004328  -0.074465*   0.096095
 (0.053996)  (0.028620)  (0.042501)  (0.063711)
Rural (settlement type dummy)  -0.098692  -0.030775  -0.063371   0.088654
 (0.064069)  (0.034477)  (0.051357)  (0.092939)
Inhabitants (thousands)   0.001839***   0.000604    0.002717***   0.006035***
 (0.000558)  (0.000576)  (0.000751)  (0.001691)
Population density (k inhabitants per km²)   0.232306***   0.162877*   0.011544   0.564963**
 (0.084639)  (0.085318)  (0.055047)  (0.308756)
Population density squared  -0.081644*  -0.158529***    -0.181956***  -1.976321***
 (0.044354)  (0.055641)  (0.061856)  (0.487067)
Per capita income (k Euro)   0.034743***   0.045888***   0.010463**   0.039304**
 (0.005819)  (0.005457)  (0.004561)  (0.015136)
Local property tax leverage factor (percent)   0.028200   0.018898   0.029937   0.048887
 (0.043210)  (0.023152)  (0.051499)  (0.052966)
Local public spending per inhabitant (k Euro) -   0.082146***  -0.060937 -
-  (0.020999)  (0.042255) -
Constant  11.287549***  11.790790***  12.306110***  11.105710***
 (0.087422)  (0.081616)  (0.040380)  (0.160222)
AIC 2,463.60 473.18 1,152.30 2,123.93
BIC 2,584.83 738.69 1,268.55 2245.88
Adjusted R² 0.676724 0.714129 0.591045 0.622779
Number of observations 2,375 1,866 1,874 1,888
Dependent variable: log of transaction price * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Table A3: Baseline regression results, aggregate municipality-level controls for location instead
of publicly registered land value. All continuous variables are mean centered. Standard errors
reported in parentheses are cluster-robust clustering at the municipality level. The reference
category for property type is „detached house“. Lot size for BB is winsorized for one extreme
value. Price for RP is winsorized for one extreme value. Living space for RP is winsorized
for three extreme values. Lot size for SA is winsorized for one extreme value. Building age is
winsorized for SA for 28 extreme values. 36
State BB LS RP SA
Variable
Lot size (m²)   0.000018*   0.000087***   0.000199***   0.000177***
 (0.000010)  (0.000018)  (0.000044)  (0.000033)
Living space (m²)   0.005970***   0.003901***   0.003578***   0.006066***
 (0.000305)  (0.000188)  (0.000276)  (0.000598)
Age (years)  -0.007568***  -0.010186***  -0.006029***  -0.007591***
 (0.000359)  (0.000408)  (0.000431)  (0.000358)
Age squared   0.000017**   0.000046***   0.000012***   0.000019***
 (0.000007)  (0.000007)  (0.000002)  (0.000001)
Semi-detached house (dummy)  -0.119188***  -0.091351***  -0.049590*   0.074313**
 (0.026498)  (0.016247)  (0.000184)  (0.031407)
Row house end unit (dummy)  -0.316215***  -0.166330***  -0.062846**  -0.189849***
 (0.047583)  (0.028812)  (0.028903)  (0.052077)
Row house (dummy)  -0.340271***  -0.190578***  -0.141312***  -0.094640**
 (0.048239)  (0.028893)  (0.028937)  (0.045314)
Individual construction (dummy) - -  -0.133897*** -
 (0.051552)
Land value (Euro per m²)   0.005451***   0.004733***   0.002365***   0.010147***
 (0.000493)  (0.000219)  (0.000184)  (0.000970)
Log of vacancy rate  -0.194105***  -0.072491***  -0.060993*  -0.014812
 (0.041390)  (0.026776)  (0.033302)  (0.055475)
Constant  11.647380***  11.785369***  12.147135***  11.046734***
 (0.020399)  (0.012172)  (0.014247)  (0.027553)
AIC 3,373.50 1,553.36 937.85 3,704.79
BIC 3,433.05 1,614.87 998.75 3,762.94
Adjusted R² 0.645444 0.673814 0.633330 0.516041
Number of observations 2,850 3,464 1,874 2,478
Dependent variable: log of transaction price * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Table A4: Baseline regression results, object characteristics only. All continuous variables are
mean centered. Standard errors reported in parentheses are cluster-robust clustering at the
municipality level. The reference category for property type is „detached house“. Lot size for
BB is winsorized for one high value. Price for RP is winsorized for one high value. Living space
for RP is winsorized for three high values. Lot size for SA is winsorized for one high value.
Building age is winsorized for SA for 28 high values.
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State BB LS RP SA
Variable
Lasso procedure controls yes yes yes yes
Log of vacancy rate  -0.061230*  -0.083460***  -0.057107*  -0.032705
 (0.031074)  (0.019768)  (0.030798)  (0.052248)
Constant  11.686115***  11.799901***  12.123543***  11.198015***
 (0.020417)  (0.010697)  (0.013162)  (0.018420)
AIC 3,073.10 326.11 1095.39 3729.86
BIC 3,186.18 508.83 1150.75 3809.88
Adjusted R² 0.679903 0.733259 0.600984 0.430172
Number of observations 2,840 1,876 1,873 2,244
Dependent variable: log of transaction price * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Table A5: Regression results based on explanatory variables chosen by Lasso algorithm. For
selecting the variables, all possible interaction terms between variables are allowed. All contin-
uous variables are mean centered. Standard errors reported in parentheses are cluster-robust
clustering at the municipality level. The reference category for property type is „detached
house“.
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State BB LS RP SA
Variable
Lot size (m²)   0.000018   0.000167***   0.000236***   0.000207***
 (0.000017)  (0.000019)  (0.000025)  (0.000020)
Living space (m²)   0.005879***   0.002659***   0.002955***   0.004411***
 (0.000272)  (0.000166)  (0.000164)  (0.000300)
Age (years)  -0.007568***  -0.009665***  -0.006510***  -0.004810***
 (0.000397)  (0.000464)  (0.000366)  (0.000264)
Age squared   0.000041***   0.000036***   0.000018***   0.000012***
 (0.000009)  (0.000007)  (0.000003)  (0.000001)
Semi-detached house (dummy)  -0.105105***  -0.077349***  -0.092013***   0.018409
 (0.019425)  (0.016811)  (0.019885)  (0.024685)
Row house end unit (dummy)  -0.296034***  -0.198457***  -0.106753***  -0.055167
 (0.032499)  (0.025388)  (0.023514)  (0.034072)
Row house (dummy)  -0.378713***  -0.151786***  -0.177426***  -0.093573**
 (0.041929)  (0.020668)  (0.023575)  (0.037198)
Individual construction (dummy) - -  -0.088103*** -
- -  (0.029009) -
Further building characteristics controlled yes yes no yes
Land value (Euro per m²)   0.002724***   0.003275***   0.002647***   0.009325***
 (0.000372)  (0.000272)  (0.000129)  (0.000974)
Log of vacancy rate  -0.105881***  -0.054793***  -0.099217***  -0.082642**
 (0.029660)  (0.014995)  (0.027191)  (0.037838)
Inhabitants (thousands)   0.000510   0.001032***  -0.000671   0.002225**
 (0.000518)  (0.000365)  (0.000441)  (0.001076)
Population density (k inhabitants per km²)   0.308173***   0.044952  -0.101143***   0.067316
 (0.057123)  (0.059893)  (0.032730)  (0.116216)
Population density squared  -0.221853***  -0.165935***  -0.020590  -0.881603***
 (0.050949)  (0.033035)  (0.032992)  (0.231027)
Per capita income (k Euro)   0.027352***   0.034436***  -0.002785   0.011311
 (0.005581)  (0.003824)  (0.003049)  (0.008545)
Local property tax leverage factor (percent)   0.038794  -0.011446   0.087376***   0.011893
 (0.037228)  (0.018373)  (0.031418)  (0.032511)
Local public spending per inhabitant (k Euro) -   0.063967***   0.127395*** -
-  (0.016680)  (0.029241) -
Constant  11.298927***  11.753895***  12.172463***  11.371777***
 (0.071508)  (0.044746)  (0.019744)  (0.038164)
AIC 1,362.28 -392.63 -83.70 1,101.94
BIC 1,459.61 -173.52 9.55 1,206.31
Adjusted R² 0.740445 0.787284 0.723216 0.714462
Number of observations 2,266 1,768 1,781 1,796
Dependent variable: log of transaction price * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Table A6: Baseline regression results without influential observations (Cook’s D > 4/N, cor-
responding to 0.00168 for Brandenburg, 0.00214 for Lower Saxony, 0.00213 for Rhineland-
Palatinate and 0.00212 for Saxony-Anhalt). All continuous variables are mean centered. Stan-
dard errors reported in parentheses are cluster-robust clustering at the municipality level. The
reference category for property type is „detached house“.
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